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This paper is part of a research project on the effects of environmental policies on the
international competitiveness. It discusses the so-called Porter Hypothesis which
states that a comparably stricter environmental policy may lead to an increase in
competitiveness. This paper constitutes a chapter of an intended monograph and
covers the dynamic aspects of this discussion. Other chapters on intersectoral effects
in a general equilibrium framework and on the contribution of the theory of strategic
environmental policies can be found in the Kiel Working Papers No. 857 and 858,
respectively. We gratefully acknowledge financial support by the Fritz Thyssen
Foundation.1 Introduction
Stahler (1998) discussed models of strategic environmental policies. These models
have dealt with research and development only in terms of a strategic decision which
precedes the strategic decision of firms in the marketplace. From that perspective,
investment in research and development does not differ from the specification of
environmental quality or any other quality decision of a producer. It has been shown in
Stahler (1998) that the results are rather ambiguous on a general level and that the
Porter Hypothesis is far away from being able to be supported in general. However,
one may think of the Porter Hypothesis not only as a static strategic result but also as a
long-run forecast. In this case, the role of research and development has to be
considered in a dynamic framework.
In this paper, we will consider the problem from such a dynamic perspective, taking
into account that the choice of a technology is not only a function of current
investment but a function of all previous investment decisions. This assumption allows
us to discuss the potential long-run effects of a unilateral environmental policy on the
competitive position of an industry. Even more, this dynamic framework is able to
capture the Porter Hypothesis properly since it was obviously Porter's intention to
emphasize the long-run effects of strict environmental policies. Therefore, the
discussion of the Porter Hypothesis can not be restricted to static models.
The discussion of research and development has meanwhile a long tradition in
economics. Since the pathbreaking paper of Solow (1957), a lot of papers have dealt
with the role of research of development for both the behavior of an industry and the
wealth of a country. Solow found out that the huge part of productivity growth in the
United States could not be explained by physical capital accumulation. Hence, the
formation of human capital and successful research and development are now
considered as crucial for the growth of an economy. From this perspective, the Porter
Hypothesis can be seen as a long-run forecast that a strict environmental policy leadsto an increased level of research and development which increases the wealth of a
country in the long run.
Following Solow's paper, the discussion of research and development has been a main
issue in the industrial organization literature (see any textbook, for example Tirole,
1988 or Martin, 1993). The reason for this development is that research and
development done by a firm implies substantial strategic effects. Some of them were
already mentioned in Stahler (1998). If a firm is successful in research and
development, it may be able to reduce competition in a sector or even monopolize the
market. Several features can be observed in markets which are subject to research and
development. First, the profitability of research and development depends on the
degree of appropriability of the success of research and development. If a firm is only
able to appropriate a part of the success, the incentive to do research and development
is decreased. This might be the case if an invention can be copied by other firms
without compensation or if the invention is a public good. Second, different types of
competition may be distinguished. On the one hand, research and development of
different technological firms may lead to success of more than one of them because,
for example, different technological opportunities may exist for improving a certain
technology. On the other hand, only one successful option may exist such that the
winner is able to take the whole market when he is the first one to be successful.
In general, it is not known whether there is too much or too little research and
development. Too little research and development can be expected if a certain market
is monopolized since a monopolist increases competition with himself by a high degree
of research and development (Arrow, 1962). Additionally, a substantial spillover effect
reduces the incentive for research and development. If only one firm can win a
research and development race, it is known that expenditures are too high compared to
the socially optimal level because the prospect to monopolize a market makes it
profitable for each firm to spend a large amount on research and development.Due to the different possible strategic interactions, it is not easy to deal with research
and development on a rather general level (for an overview, see Reinganum, 1984). In
this paper, we will therefore assume that research and development will reduce
environmental compliance costs of a certain firm deterministically. By this assumption,
we are able to focus on the long-run,effects of stricter environmental policies which
are claimed to be beneficial by the Porter Hypothesis. This paper is organized as
follows. Section 2. will present a specified dynamic model which is able to
demonstrate the effects of strict environmental policies in a dynamic framework. It will
be shown that a general validity of the Porter Hypothesis can also not be concluded in
this model. Since the model is very specific, Section 3 will present a more general
treatment of the Porter Hypothesis in dynamic models. Obviously, a more general
treatment will not be able to resolve the ambiguity a specified model produces. But
this general model will also show the additional effects assumed by the Porter
Hypothesis in a general setting which cannot be captured by the static approach as it
was discussed in Stahler (1998). However, it will also be shown that the dynamic
model does not differ substantially from the static model except for these effects.
Section 4 will conclude.
2 A specified dynamic model
This section will present a numerical example in order to discuss the potential validity
of the Porter Hypothesis in a dynamic setting. The numerical example assumes two
countries which are able to introduce a certain environmental program. This program
reduces a certain environmental damage and imposes costs to the firms. There are only
two firms in a market, each in a different country, and market entry is not possible.
These firms produce a certain homogeneous good and the sum of production





























and the abatement cost
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inverse market demand function:
cost function: Q =O,5xf
emission function: E; = x;
abatement costs:








The inverse demand function is linear. Without any abatement efforts, emissions are
released in the same quantity as production. Abatement is possible and implies
quadratic costs which depend on a technology parameter p as a function of time. This
technology parameter can be changed by pursuing a research and development (R&D)
program. The example assumes that a R&D program incurs costs of 0.1 if it is done(and, of course, zero costs if it is not). The assumption of a binary choice of either
doing R&D or not will simplify the discussion of strategic options which a domestic
firm has which is subject to a stricter environmental regulation. The R&D program has
a deterministic effect: it lowers the technology parameter p in the next period. Hence,
a program done today shifts the abatement cost function down for tomorrow. This
shift, however, is restricted such that only five programs can be successful and that any
further program has no effect on the technology parameter. Figure 1 shows the












Figure 4.1: Reduction costs as a function of aggregated
R&D programs
• • • •
0,1 0,2 0,3 0,4 0,5 0,6 0,7 0,8
Figure 1 shows that any further R&D program is useless when already five programs
have been undertaken. The effect of R&D is deterministic in this model. The results
would not change substantially if they were subject to uncertainty and Figure 1 gave
the expected reduction of the technology parameter. But the analysis would be more
involved since it had to be taken into account that R&D could fail in a certain period
and that therefore plans have to be revised.
The environmental program introduced by the government is assumed to imply a
certain emission limit such that the emission of the firm should not exceed 0.5. Due to
the specification of the demand and the cost function and the assumption that
7unregulated emissions are equal to production, this constraint is binding if the
environmental program is introduced. Without any regulation, the production and
emission level of each firm would be unity, given that each firm maximizes the current
profits in each period.
The environmental policy behavior is assumed to be very simple: the environmental
program is assumed to imply certain environmental benefits, and it implies certain
costs for the industry. The policy makers are assumed to decide simply on the basis of
a critical technology parameter. This critical technology parameter is an indicator how
far the industry is supposed to be able to carry the burden of regulation. They are
assumed to decide on the basis of the current parameter, and in order to create a
problem of stricter environmental policies, country 1 assumes a critical parameter of
unity and country 2 assumes a critical parameter of 0.7. These assumptions imply that
country 1 will introduce the environmental program but country 2 will not. This
assumed behavior might found to be too simplistic. However, we already employ a
specified model and we are interested in first insights of the chances of the Porter
Hypothesis. Hence, we may employ a simple decision rule to make the basic effects
clear. The- next section will employ a more sophisticated and proper decision rule
which takes into account the intertemporal effects.
In addition to those features of the model given by Table 1, further assumptions are the
following:
• Country 2 will introduce the environmental program as well if p has been reduced
to 0.7.
This assumption ensures that country 2 will follow country 1 if the technology
parameter has been reduced to 0.7. If it is possible for the foreign firm to buy the
abatement technology for this technology level, it will be forced to do so.
• A firm is able to sell an abatement technology to another firm for a price which
surmounts the factual abatement costs.This assumption ensures that the domestic firm can make profits with selling the
technology. Since the lowest value which the technology parameter can reach is
0.5, the difference to 0.7 may be realized. One may think of this abatement
technology as a separate unit of the plant which is run by the seller.
• Each firm maximizes its current profits.
This assumption determines the behavior of each firm in the product market. It is
not so obvious as it seems at first glance. Since the firms compete against each
other not only once but always, it is well known that other than the non-cooperative
equilibria of a single-stage game may give an equilibrium (see, for example,
Fudenberg, Maskin, 1986). The so-called Folk Theorem proved that all rational and
attainable outcomes may be the result of a game which repeats the singe-stage
games infinitely. Here, we assume that the behavior of each firm is purely non-
cooperative. This assumption is constructive also because here we find no repeated
but a dynamic game (if R&D programs are introduced) for which the Folk Theorem
does not hold in general as for repeated games (see Dutta, 1995, Stahler, Wagner,
1998).
• The foreign firm does not do own research and development.
In general, firm 2 could also invest in research and development in order to reduce
the technology parameter. This option will be ignored, and it can be shown easily
for this model that this option is very unlikely to be profitable for firm 2.
When country 1 introduces the environmental program and country 2 does not, firm 1
faces three options:
• According to Option I, firm 1 reduces the abatement cost parameter until it is
minimized. Since it makes no sense to delay such a policy, this will be done in the
first periods after which this technology parameter has reached the intended level.
For the sake of simplicity, we will restrict our attention to a policy which implies10
abatement cost minimization. It can be shown easily for this model that the
technology parameter will be reduced to 0.5 (and not only to 0.6) in most cases if
firm 1 intends to make profits with selling the technology.
• According to Option II, firm 1 reduces the technology parameter only to 0.7 in
order to imply environmental regulation also in the other country. For the same
reason as for Option I, this policy will be carried out in the first three periods. In
this case, firm 1 is not able to make profits with selling the technology, but implies
that the cost structure is the same for both firms after 0.7 has been reached by the
technology parameter.
• According to Option III, firm 1 accepts the disadvantage due to unilateral
environmental policies and refrains from any R&D program. In that case, the
symmetric duopoly is changed into an asymmetric one in which firm 1 has to carry
higher costs per production. We will restrict our attention to this option and will
not discuss policies which reduce the technology parameter to 0.9 or 0.8, i.e.
policies which do not imply the introduction in the other country but nevertheless a
decrease in the technology parameter.
Table 2 gives the profits implied by Options I and II.
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Table 2: Profits for options I and II
Option I: R&D programs until abatement costs
are minimized
Option II: R&D programs until country




































































Notes: l\\. denotes the profits of firm 1 in the commodity market, FIi+ denotes the profits realized by selling the abatement technology.
Pl and p2 denote the state of the abatement technology employed by the respective firm. If P2 = 0, firm 2 is not (yet) subject to any
environmental regulation. Without any regulation the profits are FI j = Fl2 = 1 -5.
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If firm 2 decides for Option III, i.e. no R&D programs, the technology parameters and
the profits for all periods are
(1) pi =1, p2 = 0, nj = 1.2882, n2 = 1.6271.
Based on Table 2 and (1), one may now compute the sum of discounted profits of all
three options in order to compare their relative profitability. Three computations for
three different discount factors are shown in Table 3. The discount factor measures the
time preference and depends on the time which elapses between subsequent periods.
The longer the delay between investment in research and development and the effect
on the technology parameter, the lower is the discount factor.


















From Table 3, we see that a sufficiently high discount factor is able to imply Option I.
In this case, it pays for firm 1 to reduce the technology parameter to its minimum and
to sell the abatement technology. When the discount factor is decreased, Options II and
III become more profitable. Hence, we see already in this simplistic model that a
stricter environmental policy does not necessarily increase the profits of the domestic
firm in the long run. Additionally, Table 3 shows that the sum of discounted profits is
about 13.76 for Option I for a discount factor of 0.9. Due to Table 2, the current profits
without regulation are 1.5, and hence the sum of discounted profits without regulation
for a discount factor of 0.9 is 15. Thus, the optimistic variant of the example shows
only that the current profits of the domestic firm increase in the course of time due to
1213 monomer
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research and development (after they have been decreased by regulation). But
environmental regulation leads also to a decrease in the firm's value (measured by the
sum of discounted profits) of about 1.24. From this example, we can therefore not
conclude that profits are increased in absolute terms but in the best case in relative
terms in future periods.
Additionally, all these results rely on very crucial requirements:
• The domestic firm cannot move.
This assumption is crucial for this model because the sum of discounted profits is
less under environmental regulation than without regulation. If the domestic firm
could move, it would do so and increase its value by 1.24 in the case of a discount
factor of 0.9.
• The firm must be able to commercialize the results of research and development.
It must be guaranteed that the foreign firm is not able to copy the technology
developed by firm 1 without compensation. This requirement is met if either
research and development are embodied in human capital or the intellectual
property rights of firm 1 are accepted by country 2. It is well known that the
international acknowledgement of intellectual property rights is not guaranteed
because country 2 would benefit from a technology transfer without compensation.
• Research and development must be carried by a domestic firm or by a domestic
supplier of environmentally friendly technologies.
If the technology is developed in another country, the additional profits will not be
realized in the domestic industry. Hence, the profits from selling the technology are
given only if no foreign firm is able to develop the technology.
If one of these requirements is violated, the optimistic result cannot become true.
1314
Until now, the environmental benefits have not yet been considered. Even if profits are
decreased and the technology is not sold, the net benefits of introducing the
environmental program may be positive. But this possibility does not prove the Porter
Hypothesis since this hypothesis claims that both the firm's profits and the
environmental benefits are increased. Additionally, the whole analysis relies on a
simple reaction mechanism of the other country. From these results, one may conclude
that only special circumstances may imply a positive effect of stricter environmental
policies on a domestic industry's performance in the long run.
3 A general dynamic model
The last section has discussed a specified and simplistic example of the potential long-
run effects of strict unilateral environmental policies. This section will generalize the
approach in order to pronounce the differences between this dynamic approach and the
static models. It will discuss a dynamic two-period model in which the R&D decisions
affect the profits of both firms in the second period. Table 4 gives the general structure
of this model which assumes also two firms in two different countries.











Firms specify their market
strategies for period'0.
Firms specify their market
strategies for period 1.
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In order to simplify the analysis, the model assumes that there are no direct spillover
effects of one firm's R&D to the other firm's profits. Additionally, it is assumed that
each firm is able to appropriate its own R&D by selling, for example, an advanced
technology on the market. A decisive assumption of the Porter Hypothesis is that green
technologies and/or green products will have an increasing market share in the future.
Since environmental problems are due to the public bad property of environmental
degradation, it should be clear that this increasing market share must originate from
political demand, i.e. from stricter environmental regulation by other countries in the
course of time. In the model, we will capture this idea by a political response function
for the second period:




(2) gives the degree of regulation by country 2 in the second period as a function of the
degree of regulation in country 1. We assume that regulation does not differ between
periods for country 1 but that country 2 adjusts its policy for the second period as a
response to the strictness of environmental policies in country 1. If country 1
introduces Pigouvian regulation (denoted by the superscript Pigou), country 2 will do
as well. We will determine Pigouvian regulation soon, and we will assume in a first
step that both countries introduce Pigouvian regulation. For this case, country 2 will
not change its regulation in the second period, but if country 1 imposes a stricter
regulation, a stricter regulation will be implied by country 2 in the second period.
Starting from overall Pigouvian regulation, one may then explore the incentives of
country 1 to make environmental regulation marginally stricter.
The profits of both firms are given by (3).
(3) n1=7c1[s1(O),s2(O),r,,a1] + 57t1[s,(l),s2(2),r1,a1,a2(a1)],
n2=7c2[s1(O),s2(O),r2,a2] + 87C2[s1(l),s2(2),r2,d2(a1)].
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(3) shows that the profits are the sum of discounted profits over two period. One may
consider the second period as comprising all future periods. The current profits are
denoted by n. sj(t) denotes the market strategy level of firm i in period t, oq denotes the
level of environmental regulation in county i and rj denotes the level of research and
development of firm i. We assume that research and development incurs costs in the
first period and increases profits by environmental compliance cost reduction in the
second period. Additionally, the reaction of country 2 to country l's policy
specification has different impacts on both firms. Since we restrict our attention to a
stricter policy, an increase in &2 benefits firm 1 because firm 1 is now able to sell at
least a part of its technology to firm 2. Conversely, this increase decreases firm 2's
profits because it is now forced to more environmental protection.
Pigouvian regulation means in this case that each country chooses a regulation level
for both periods which maximizes total welfare. Total welfare is defined by the




Similar definitions and assumptions were given in Stahler (1998). (2) to (4) imply a
strategic game between both firms which can be influenced by country 1. Due to Table
4, the countries move first by specifying the degree of environmental regulation. (2)
implies that only country 1 has a strategic option since country 2 is supposed to
introduce Pigouvian regulation in the first period and a policy in the second period
which responds to country l's policy. By (2), it is therefore explicitly assumed that
country 2 cannot behave strategically. This assumption is crucial and not without
difficulty. If both countries could behave strategically, they would enter a prisoners'
dilemma situation because both would gain by acting non-strategically but one country
gains even more if it acts strategically given non-strategic behavior of the other
1617
country. Stahler (1998) has demonstrated this result which is prevented by assumption
(2).
As in Stahler (1998), the game can be solved in the usual backward induction fashion.
The first-order conditions with respect to the strategic variables are
(5) gives four conditions since t denotes either period 0 or period 1. Note that we have
not specified whether the market strategy variable is a price or a production level. We
are therefore still rather general and the analysis will hold for both strategic substitutes
and complements as they were introduced and explained in Stahler (1998). The
conclusions of the last section's example were drawn on the basis of competition by
strategic substitutes. (5) determines equilibrium strategy levels s*(t) which are a
function of the research and development levels in the first period and the degree of
environmental regulation. Under the use of these equilibrium strategy levels, we may
now define indirect profit functions which determine the sum of discounted profits
under the condition that (5) is fulfilled:
(6) n^rj.r^cc^&^cc,)), n2(r,,r2,a2,d2(a1))
(6) does only consider the regulation level of country 1 and the response of country 2
in the second period because (2) fixes the regulation level of country 2 for the first
period. (6) determines the equilibrium profits which are possible in the last two stages
of the game. In the second stage, both firms choose their R&D levels in order to
maximize (6). The behavior on this stage is given by (7).
(7)
We may then differentiate (7) totally with respect to both R&D levels and the
environmental regulation in country 1. As a result we may derive a relationship18












(8) shows that this reaction is influenced substantially by the political response
function (2). 7 gives the product of the second derivatives of the indirect profit function
with respect to its own market strategy variablerninus the product of the second cross
derivatives of the indirect profit functions. 7 is assumed to be positive in order to
guarantee that the effect of the own market strategy on own profits is larger than those
of the opponent's market strategy. In Section 5 of Stahler (1998), it was shown that this
is in fact just an assumption because it is not guaranteed by straightforward
assumptions about the behavior of the basic profit functions.
Additionally, it was shown in Section 5 of Stahler (1998) that the sign of
cannot be determined in general. As Section 5 of Stahler (1998) employed a static
model, the effect is obviously even more ambiguous in the setting of this paper
because first effects are intertemporal (and therefore also influenced by the discount
factor), and second the political response function enters expression (8) twice. (8)
determines the change of profits of the domestic firm which is due to a stricter
environmental policy:
(9)
as2(t) dr2 "j anx d^ arii ar^ dd: | da, y3s2(t)^ 3r, da, dr2 dax J 3r, da, 3a, d&2 da!
We may ignore the first derivative with respect to the own market strategy levels due
... . _, . /cs „. du: ^ an, 3s2(t) an, _ ,
to the maximization carried out in (5). Since -^r-*- = > ^r—7—-^— + -rr—
L = 0 due
d* ds(t) 3^ ar
to (7), we may simplify (9):
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dn, _ y dn, ds*2 (t) dr2 | an, | dn, dd ( ' daj T3s2(t) 9r2 daj da[ 3a2 &ax
(10) shows that only the reaction of the opponent, the reaction of the other country and
the direct cost effect of regulation are relevant for the change of profits. A similar
result was demonstrated in Stahler (1998). Because we have chosen Pigouvian
regulation to consider marginal increases in domestic environmental regulation, total
differentiation of welfare under the use of (4) gives (11).
m) dw1=y dUj 3s;(t) dr2 | ar^dd, r. da! ^3s2(t) 3r2 dc^ 3d2 da,
(11) shows that the total welfare effect depends only on the change caused by the
market strategy reactions and the political response. The only general difference
between-this dynamic and the static models is the last term giving the political
response. Since one may assume that increased regulation in the foreign country
increases the domestic firm's profits because it is able to sell green technologies, this
effect is positive if environmental regulation is marginally stricter than Pigouvian
regulation. However, the first term is ambiguous and may have a negative sign. A
negative sign can be produced by strategic substitutes and strategic complements since
the R&D effect is totally unclear. Even if one could separate market strategy decision
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From (11) and (12), we may conclude that the dynamic model produces ambiguity as
well. Therefore, even the optimistic assumption (2) which excludes strategic behavior
of the foreign country can not make a case for the Porter Hypothesis. Additionally, the
political response function itself makes it harder to compute the reaction of the foreign
firm's R&D to a stricter regulation since it changes the market behavior of firms.
1920
4 Conclusions
This paper has discussed the Porter Hypothesis in a dynamic framework since this
hypothesis was obviously intended as a long-run forecast. However, the dynamic
framework could not support the Porter Hypothesis in general as well. The specified
and simplistic example has demonstrated that the Porter Hypothesis may hold only
under very artificial conditions. Even more, the example showed merely that the
relative profits were increased in the course of time by strict domestic environmental
policies, but the total value of the firm was decreased. Basically, the question is of
empirical nature but the theoretical discussion has shown that a lot of conditions have
to be fulfilled. In particular, we would like to stress three important factors which will
obviously be also very relevant for the empirical discussion:
• The effect of strict environmental regulation is very involved and changes the
market behavior of firms in an unpredictable way. It depends on the reaction of
R&D to stricter environmental policies and the type of competition in the market. If
there is free market entry and the possibility to move, the optimistic variant cannot
become true.
• If a firm in a third country or a multinational firm develops the technology, the
benefits of R&D cannot be realized.
• The success of R&D must be appropriable in order to give incentives to introduce a
R&D program.
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